President U Thein Sein has managed to "flip the switch" in Myanmar politics, gaining legitimacy for the constitution and bringing international and domestic critics on board his reform program. Reinforcing this with rapid economic development, however, will be a much harder act to follow. It may require a different approach - one that includes the very people U Thein Sein has sought to exclude.

Myanmar's liberation from a half-century of isolation has captivated the world, not least of all because of its undoubted economic potential. But with outbreaks of violence, uncertainties over governance and economic reforms, and the unknowable composition of the next government, it is understandable that many foreign investors are taking a "wait and see" approach. When you factor in over-priced land, a still overvalued exchange rate, a severely constricted domestic market and woefully inadequate infrastructure, only business plans using highly complex random walk algorithms can make the numbers stack up.

President U Thein Sein has already achieved his principal objective - international acceptance and legitimacy for Myanmar's new constitution. However, his reliance on foreigners for the economic follow-through and the distancing of himself from many of Myanmar's leading business families - whose patriarchs are often referred to as "cronies" for the patronage they enjoyed under the preceding government that he wishes to differentiate himself from - is problematic. Myanmar's economic take-off - a necessary reinforcement for its nascent democracy – hinges primarily not on foreign economic relations but on the handling of domestic state-business relations.

In terms of development priorities, the major challenge for the government after agriculture and the rural sector is to create new jobs through industrial development. As a poor country, Myanmar's domestic market is small so growth needs to be achieved through exports, both of agricultural commodities produced from labour-intensive family farms and other products from labour-intensive manufacturing. But to be export competitive Myanmar needs a massive upgrade in its infrastructure. The current and former governments have looked to foreign investors to take the lead but this strategy is problematic and unsustainable for two reasons. First, foreign project promoters struggle to manage relations with the military and civilian bureaucracies. Second, if Myanmar people perceive that their national infrastructure has fallen under foreign control a populist politician may emerge to reverse the process.

Ports are an example of the first reason why foreign-dominated

infrastructure development is problematic. The Dawei project has foundered and the Chinese are complaining about the slow progress at Kyaukpyu. At the Thilawa Special Economic Zone, which includes port terminal facilities, the proposed development vehicle is still unregistered and therefore unable to sign a concession agreement. Progress in site development is reliant on Japanese aid. It's a similar story in terms of power generation, where signed memoranda of understanding collectively account for a 60 percent increase in capacity but nothing has yet progressed to Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) approval. The recent awarding of two mobile phone operating licences to foreign companies is to be applauded but the ease and swiftness of network roll-out remains to be seen.

Ports may also offer an example of the second reason: Thilawa for the Japanese, Kyaukpyu for the Chinese, Dawei for the Thais, and something else for the South Koreans and the Americans looks a bit like economic partition. Even foreign-owned energy infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and hydro-electric power plants, could provide raw material for future nationalist populist politicians. The problem is not so much with foreign participation in infrastructure development but with actual or

perceived "foreign domination".

An infrastructure upgrade, however, is a precondition for the rapid industrial development necessary for large-scale job creation and political stability. It is in the nature of infrastructure development that the state plays a central role – for strategic planning, regulation of monopolistic concessions and so on – but the private sector is needed for their initiative and greater efficiency. The leadership in infrastructure development should come from Myanmar-owned companies and this makes the management of domestic state-business relations critical. Foreigners have an important role to play in supporting Myanmar businesses in terms of project design and contributing early stage technical and equity capital resources, and later as implementation subcontractors where necessary, but infrastructure development should not be dominated by foreign investment.

Given the limits of state capacity and the multitude of bilateral and multilateral development partners calling at their door, government infrastructure development planning will be slow and bureaucratic. Leading local entrepreneurs will not hold their breath waiting for results and will simply refrain from getting involved. Myanmar's most powerful business conglomerates, which have the experience of getting big projects off the ground and of managing state-business relations effectively, also have many other businesses - such as property development, cement and consumer credit - that can yield satisfactory short-term profits. They know that large infrastructure projects can make them the really big money but these guys are not dreamers. In fact, quite the opposite: They are experts in the art of assessing what is possible. As a result, many of Myanmar's leading businesspeople are biding their time and concentrating on growing existing businesses.

But the economic history lessons of East Asia makes it clear that rapid industrialisation requires a strongly interventionist role from government. The president has to direct national entrepreneurs into activities that yield a high development dividend for the country as a whole rather than just leaving them to their own devices to pursue private profit as they see fit. The national entrepreneurs may not like it but being the richest and most powerful businesspeople in the country comes with responsibilities. And they can also be incentivised by the prospect of joining the same billionaire's club that their regional counterparts have entered through a similar process.

It seems unlikely though that U Thein Sein will suddenly embrace the "cronies" in the cause of national development. U-turns are not easy manoeuvres for politicians and the businesspeople themselves may not be interested in cultivating a politician they perceive as having a limited shelf life. Much-needed administrative reform may absorb much of U Thein Sein's energy anyway. All eyes are understandably focused on what might be the composition and nature of the next government but rather than speculate on what will happen let's consider what needs to happen.

Now that nearly all sanctions have been lifted and the new constitution enjoys legitimacy at home and abroad, Myanmar's next president needs to be a strong personality with a keen understanding of the "development state" and the role it must play in harnessing and directing domestic and foreign business to realise national development objectives. If matters are left solely to the public sector it will take too long. The ability of the many thousands of small- and medium-sized enterprises in the country to grow and prosper, augmented by investment from foreign firms, is predicated on the country's big businessmen delivering on infrastructure. These entrepreneurs have the seed capital, organisation, connections and experience of working with government to take the lead on infrastructure project development, drawing on international technical expertise and capital as necessary. But as well as directing the business patriarchs towards certain types of infrastructure the new president must facilitate international project financing for them too, for which this person needs to understand the nature of global finance.

Global finance is divided up into two systems: Non-China finance - the United States dollar-denominated international financial architecture controlled by the US - and China finance. The new Myanmar president must direct Myanmar entrepreneurs to one or the other system depending on whether they are on the US Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The US has indicated that names do not readily come off its blacklist, which effectively denies individuals and organisations access to the global financial system that it controls.

Instead, those on the SDN list must cultivate relations with China sources of project financing - the China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export Import Bank (CEB) - and the non-SDNs must jump through the hoops set by the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC), Asian Development Bank and the Japanese and South Korean development banks.

Globally, in 2010 the World Bank/IFC lent about $100 billion, while the CDB and CEB together lent about $110 billion. China also has a foreign financing war chest of $2.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Myanmar's next president can maximise capital inflows for infrastructure by placing the world's two financial systems in competition with each other. Nay Pyi Taw may work with the two categories of entrepreneurs in different ways. This dual system will be complex for the new president to manage - and often contradictory messages will be sent out to society - but given the nature of the external financing options it is simple pragmatism if the country is to maximise capital inflows for national development and poverty reduction. Indeed, the success of the next president may be evaluated and quantified according to how much infrastructure project financing he manages to pull in because this criteria serves as a reasonable proxy for economic take-off, poverty reduction and performance legitimacy, provided project selection and execution is reasonably efficient.

So where does that leave us for the next two years? Well, of course, there is plenty of time for unpleasant surprises and fire-fighting. But there is also the hosting of the Southeast Asian Games to be enjoyed and the chairing of ASEAN next year. There will be plenty of opportunities for high-level socialising as domestic and international political, business and civil society elites contemplate Myanmar's next crucial phase - the one where the "big money" plays - and strategise and position themselves for it.

By Stuart Larkin

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